The ICANN MS BUG

The Internet Constructed As a Non-Neutral Market Should Be Unilaterally Global.

The “IN” (ICANN/NTIA) DNS CLASS’ fundamental concept.
The BUG was until now an NTIA “feature”: will this continue?

JFC MORFIN appeal to the IAB
concerning the IESG response to his appeal
centering the IESG approval of the
"draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response"

June 22, 2017

A digital meshware or meshware (“relationnel” in French) is any set of rules, references, parameters and services that allow two or more networked nodes to interoperate between them via any kind of exchange protocol over a data link connecting them. Interoperating computer meshware contrasts with computer software, which is any set of machine-readable instructions that directs a digital processor to perform specific operations, and computer hardware, which is the physical component of computers.

The catenet is understood as the concatenation of the shared local digital resources that supports the global meshware. A VGN (virtual glocal network) is the global organization of network resources and overlay systems organized by a user to address his/her “local” (as per IEN 78: “peculiar to the particular network”) needs.

I introduced the brainware (“noogitiel” in French) in 1978 as the shared human capacity to use software and hardware through meshware. Wikipedia (in TNS: Technology Support Net) introduces it as the purpose, reason, and justification for using or deploying the hardware/software in a particular way, i.e. it is the know-what and the know-why of technology: what to use or deploy, when, where and why.

The “LIBRE Global Community” is an emerging RFC 6852 “Global Community” of which the economy is based upon the freedom to use commonly accepted meshware for any purpose as well as to preferably use meshware that can be freely studied, modified, distributed, adapted, and interoperated with Libre Software for Open Security reasons. It is spelled as “LIBRE” for being free even from “Libre”.
Dear colleagues,

I have introduced an appeal on March 11, 2015 to the IESG. It was answered on April 16, 2015. This response introduced further motives of appeal. I have awaited the maximum permitted time to escalate it to the IAB due to the special nature of the concerned Draft that makes it both dependent on external events and a key contributor to these events, which thereby condition the future of the IETF and its technology.

This waiting period was judicious, as a key contribution was published by the Government of Brazil on June 3 and was discussed among various communities and political networks, including the emerging my own LIBRE community that I mostly listen to.

I. My main premises

This appeal is based upon the identification of the issues at stake along three technical strata:

- **Engineering** is the IESG responsibility. My appeal to the IESG was, therefore, engineering and RFC 2026 internet standardization process oriented.

- **Architecture** is the IAB responsibility. This is the level of this appeal.

- **Architectonics** is the synthesis of the entire physical, intellectual, economic, political, etc. issues and primary causes that make the world digital ecosystem (WDE) ecology. This stratum, which is the one changed by the NTIA transition, lacks a clear self-understanding of its reality, mechanisms, partners, and governance. Its main partners have been identified by IAB, IETF, IEEE, ISOC, and W3C in RFC 6852 as “Global Communities benefitting humanity”, abbreviated as GCs.

This is the RFC 6852 model that the IAB promotes. It looks adequate to me except in regards of its driving forces. Along this “OpenStand” model, GCs are only driven by the market forces. The emulation among GCs leads to innovation through a non-formalized and, therefore, permissionless innovation race.

I was to bring that lack of inter-GC concerted governance solution to the attention of ISOC when the NTIA, supported by ISOC, introduced its own “enhanced cooperation” (as called by the WSIS) solution, in publishing its intent to see its own remote supervision replaced by a multistakeholder (MS) vision to be studied and documented by ICANN. The “governments on an equal footing” with OpenStand GCs comes as an OpenStand aftermath, and a response to the need emphasized by my appeal.

I do not think it is in tune with the “omnistakeholderist” reality where permissionless innovation permits anyone to introduce architectonic, architectural, engineering, and best practice changes.
II. The IETF mission under the circumstances

Our IETF mission is not to discuss the merits of any given architectonical solution, it is only to understand them in order to measure their impact on the technology we produce and make it seamlessly adapt to the context of its real life use. This why I consider that the IETF deliverables MUST pass a double “running code and living mode” “intertest”.

I had appealed the publication of RFC 6852 as being incomplete. In trying to identify the origin of the huge bounty brought to the world by the internet and the World Wide Web, it misunderstood that there are global forces other than market forces. Therefore, they have not considered two key points that are changing and that we must take into account:

- The unique remote oversight that the world had delegated to the NTIA and IAB since 1986. Until the IANAPLAN Draft and Jari Arkko’s Jan 8, 2015 blog entry, the oversight of the digital world was remotely entrusted to the NTIA under the technical guidance and IANA authority of IAB. The IETF has now consensually decided, along the RFC 2026 process, on its adherence to the ICANN RFC 6852 Global Community of which it will be the SDO along the transition plan decided and conducted by the NTIA. This is a fact that is NOT the target of this appeal as the IESG has misconceived it.

This appeal concerns the lack of response to the general situation that this IETF decision has created. The IESG response is inadequate because it does not answer the questions of which the answers would permit to best manage the transition outside of the IETF and cooperation with it.

1. The world’s trust in the NTIA/IAB system has been declared as no longer possible.
2. The NTIA and now the IAB advocate ICANN as an alternative.
3. Other national, cultural, linguistic, commercial, LIBRE, private, etc. and even individual alternatives are nearly ready or being discussed – of which several are likely to remain.

The world is in the process of exploring and choosing its new enhanced cooperation fundamental architectonic equilibrium.

- The main prevalent Internet (internet + web + I*Core) scenario of the world’s digital catenet is operationally united through the IANA.

The innovation race is changing all that due to at least four key technical evolutions that it fosters:

- Bypass of the “I*Core” self-accepted or introduced constraints (e.g. “a unique DNS authoritative root” being replaced by a billion root meshware, NDN, SDN, etc.)

- New main catenet consistent technologies outside of the IP networking solutions that can, however, use the Internet to catenet transferred names and addresses.
• The omnistakeholder nature of this innovation race by every/any lead user striving for a secure VGN (virtual glocal network), i.e. the diversity of local adaptations to people’s global digital use, resources, and solutions.

• The resulting need of a fourth “joint catenet use documentation” community besides the names, numbers, and parameters (i.e. inter-technology consistency).

How is the IETF to internally cope with this change and its technology with the “multitech” diversity?

In a nutshell, how is the IETF technology to be ported into a non-NTIA/IAB radically monopolized catenet (I use the Ivan Illich “radical monopoly” concept in the context of the Kuhn’s paradigm concept used by RFC 6852).

III. My personal interest

My interest is not in ruling the world and reforming the IETF. My interest is in my smart village, and in my “post-google” company focusing on a catenet best use by the members of the LIBRE RFC 6852 Global Community.

Prior to possibly introducing a new technology, this includes a better open use of IP solutions designed by the IETF. This “better use” corresponds to the RFC 3539’s self-assigned goal of the IETF “to make the Internet work better” those who “design, use, and manage” the internet. It is not the market oriented commercial optimization priority of RFC 6852. It is the self-oriented safe, secure and efficient use of the Catenet.

1. This means that there might be architectural divergences between our technological use of this same catenet, probably causing commercial, political, legal, etc. and possibly technical conflicts.

2. The “LIBRE GC” that I am referring to will not be the only one. This means that as a user of the deliverables of the IETF, being the ICANN RFC 6852 Global Community’s technology source that, for example, will strive to allow the respect of the 2015 FCC Open Internet of US President Obama, I will also have to use the deliverable of other SDOs from other nations, communities, and markets GCs of which the SDOs may politically have or innovatively want to adopt other network neutrality visions.

How is the IETF, under IAB guidance, going to take this into account? Or should I manage the situation by myself?

IV. Friends of foes?

In this latter case, which seems to be the common case under a “permissionless attitude”, I need the responses that the IESG has denied me if we want to coopete, as per the RFC 6852 spirit, and therefore need the answers from the IAB.
Unless the IAB wishes to competitively conflict and co-protect some kind of “I*Core radical monopoly”.

After the IESG response I received, this is the question that I, and many, have. Are the Internet users to be the masters/friends or the foes/slaves in the ICANN RFC 6852 Global Community’s internet post-transition networking model?

V. To best answer this fundamental question

Let us try to rationalize the needs that the IANAPLAN Draft and the IESG response do not cover.

1. The response to the need should come first when compared to the RFC 2026 process: it is not certain that a process designed to engineer digital systems is the most appropriate path toward a revamp of the whole ecosystem.

2. The consideration must be architectonic, i.e. not from inside one single community’s single architecture (IP from IETF for the ICANN RFC 6852 Global Community). Let us accept that:

   a. There is the world digital ecosystem.

   b. Up to now, this ecosystem was approached with a single brand of the internet technology under the unique FCC/PTT monopolies and then NTIA oversight.

   c. The need is not to rebuild the world: it will self-rebuild. The need is to make sure the IETF technology will sustain:

      i. new multiple innovating and open applications of that technology by other GCs.

      ii. new external architectures (NDN, Cloud, Ethernet, meshed networks, overlay systems, etc.)

3. How is the IETF to cope with this general issue? Is the RFC 2026 process to adapt (this Draft is the first one to consider this new context: can we take advantage from its experience?)

4. In the sole specific case of the IANA, the way in which the IETF will cope with the above issue will impact its relation to IANA and the use of the IANA other technologies. Would the specification of an IANA protocol (e.g. the Whois system) to support and exchange IANA entries among OpenStand SDOs not be a solution? Is this what the LIBRE considers under a graph oriented center of reference?

VI. Reading the political/strategic dilemma

It is useful to provide the IAB with an external global point of view so that it can compare it with its own internal culture. It is also important to emphasize the recognition of the paradigmatic change in which the NTIA is implementing the consequences from its own point of view, and that was a common contribution of IEEE, IETF, IAB, ISOC, and W3C, tuned by the NTIA, Government of Brazil and discussed by LIBRE via my appeal.
The general theme is the governance of the (big “I”) Internet as the “I*Core” organized use of the world’s catenet resources under the ICANN/NTIA constrained use of the IETF (small “I”) internet technology.

- The NTIA oversight of the DNS “IN” (ICANN/NTIA) CLASS, coupled with the integration of the NRO, has created a de facto single “Internet Global Community” (through the affirmation of commitment) that the rest of the world has accepted due to the NTIA oversight.

- In quitting this oversight, the NTIA hopes to transfer the “Internet Global Community” attributes to the” ICANN Community”, as an ICANN + Verisign ““IN” CLASS Global Community”.

- ICANN describes this as a full NTIA IANA Functions’ Stewardship Transition that leads to the internationalization (cf. Brazil) of an “ICANN Global Community”.

- This raises globalization issues that are now starting to be well documented and controverted.

- In the NTIA context, the uniqueness of the catenet interneting (IEN 48) was preserved by a single source of technological standards (the IAB supervised, IETF RFCs and harmonized names, numbers and parameters of which the consistency with the IETF internet technology was protected by IAB through the RFC 2860 framework. It made the IAB ultimately accountable for the Internet stability and evolution with its capacity to move the IANA service to an operator other than ICANN, with the Internet operations depending on the IANA.

- The appealed Draft and the (http://www.ietf.org/blog/2015/01/taking-a-step-towards-iana-transition/) IETF Chair put an end to that ICANN accountability scheme. This is consistent with the RFC 6852 new paradigm. “We embrace a modern paradigm for standards where the economics of global markets, fueled by technological advancements, drive global deployment of standards regardless of their formal status”.

This Draft is the IETF consensus as per the RFC 2026 internet standardization process concerning the way this is to be organized within that “ICANN RFC 6852 Global Community” through its IANA ICANN site.

The IETF is becoming the “ICANN RFC 6852 Global Community’s SDO”, confronted with the deployment of external internet standards of various possible statuses.

- This means that from now on the network consistency is not to be sought at the architectural stratum but rather at an OpenStand architectonical stratum (this is reasonable if the IETF wants to remain at the end to end level in a fringe to fringe and edge providers context).

This is because it will encompass (1) new non-constrained ways of using the internet technology along the now broadly accepted "permissionless innovation" strategy and practice, and (2) other technologies that may use the catenet resources in new non-IP (protocol, naming, addressing, etc.) ways.

- Since the network “global deployment of standards regardless of their formal status” is fueled by the economics of global markets, other Global Communities (“the creation of [which is] benefiting humanity”) are to be considered.
The Government of Brazil introduces a slight change to the RFC 6852 scheme: the fuel is also the decision of Governments. I have introduced a similar addition for myself: the fuel is also the money of the people and, therefore, their decision. This is line with the Tunis commitment of an enhanced cooperation between Governments, private sector, civil society, and international organizations.

- This last point emphasizes the incompleteness of the appealed Draft. It only discusses the internal status quo within the former, unique “global internet community”.

This ICANN Global Community is necessarily going to be rejoined by other “RFC 6852 Global Communities”, one of them being our LIBRE Global Community. Yet the Draft does not consider how the IETF has to adapt to this new context.

This shows that this matter was not agreed by the signatories of the OpenStand principles or by the IAB when approving the RFC 2026 form of WG/IANAPLAN charter and rules in this new context.

Therefore, these are needed:

- an IAB doctrine concerning the consideration and recognition of new RFC 6852 GCs (Global Communities).
- The addition to the RFC structure of an extension of the IANA section to consider the relation of the requested entries with these from other GCs’ technologies.

VII. Let us proceed together from this appeal

The questions that I raised are among those that GCs (as newcomers in the multistakeholder community) would like to have answered by the incumbents. They are contributed to by the emerging LIBRE GC. Other contributions will certainly come from other emerging GCs to be expected from nations, industries, and civil society members now that the IETF has chosen to tie itself solely to the NTIA strategy concerning the ICANN GC and its IANA.

Since there is no longer a global accountability framework scheme framework to protect the whole catenetting, a new solution needs to be found.

Guidance has been provided by the current practical circumstances through the denial of a response from the IESG to my 36 questions. If they do not want this denial to amount to a strategic decision of technical and operational conflicting competition policy of the "ICANN RFC 6852 Global Community" vs. the other GCs instead of the coopetition advocated by the RFC 6852 OpenStand declaration, then:

Someone else is to respond to these questions.

- My responsibility is to the Libre users,
- The Government’s responsibility is to its citizens (cf. The Government of Brazil’s statement).
• Your responsibility is the ICANN GC.
• Others around are responsible for GCs such as their cyber command (e.g. USCC, NSA), their corporate strategy (e.g. GAFAMs, ISPs), their language (Chinese, Russian, French, etc. linguistic communities), etc.
• Among them you are the most experienced body; I, therefore, ask you to consider your response carefully with the utmost rigor and scientific, architectural, and technical imagination concerning what permissionless innovation by non-coopetitive competitive or even conflicting national, industrial, and lead-users GCs might lead to and how to prevent it by open omnistakeholder cooperation.

From then on, in addition to the responses to the 36 still unanswered questions, I will work with who will want to help toward the reemergence of the initial international community that I developed starting in 1978 (Intlnet) as a “fourth community” in IETF parlance, i.e. an informed user (IUser) cross technology documentation community, supported by a mutual documentation registry system (MDRS) fed by a common MDRS protocol.

VIII. Appealing the IESG response

In order to not complicate your response process, I will only:

• Intersperse comments in the IESG response, when it shows that I probably did not express myself clearly enough.

• Append the questions that I sent to the IESG. I only quoted some contributions to the IESG: this was not for them to be taken into account as such, but rather to illustrate the kind of issues the IETF/IESG/IAB will have to deal with in a “permissionless innovation” context.

I can only repeat that the target of this appeal is to help in preventing the technical and political cacophony ahead. We already have experienced the difficulty of the concepts that we face anew: internationalization, globalization, global communities, subsidiarity, precaution, etc. in the linguistic tags and domain names. We, therefore, have some experience that we can use.

In addition, we need your inputs on your IETF internal guidance concerning how you see the update of the IETF standardization process to the NTIA proposed, ICANN claimed, BRICS extended multistakeholder process that Brazil wants to formally “multilateralize” and the LIBRE CG to “omnilateralize”. Governance is also a governance of governances.

IX. Comments on the IESG 16 April 2015 response

(The IESG response is in italics.)

“The IESG interprets the appeal as having two elements:
• one is largely focused on making comments about the IANAPLAN document
• and the other is asking questions about what the consensus on the document means.”
This interpretation seems to be pertinent. Yet it only focuses on the first element and does not answer the questions, keeping the document obscure as far as the consequences of the taken position are concerned.

“The IESG notes that appeals are not a supplement to participation in the working group, and that the appellant did, in fact participate in the working group process. We recognize that the appellant is seeking to make a precautionary appeal as stated at the beginning of the appeal text. “

Quoting my contributions to the WG was only to exemplify to external readers the kind of issues the IETF will face from permissionless innovation in a non-NTIA oversight context. It was not to defend their specific propositions.

“The IESG considers that the RFC 2026 appeals process is only available for handling actions that have already been performed, and that appeals cannot be used to develop questions about potential future actions or outcomes.”

This is correct and this is why this appeal implicitly questions the use of the RFC 2026 process for a fundamental IETF political decision.

I. I only request the steganographically hidden text in the published IETF consensus to be decoded for the non-ICANN/NTIA enlightened ones.

The IESG has not even considered this task.

II. The act of writing that has been performed in this way is an outcome that is now passed and that has already significant consequences.

The appealed document has already resulted in the IESG Chair having published on January 8, 2015 that the NTIA decides for the IETF:

“Our work is not yet complete. There are a number of steps still in front of us. They include the following:

- Both the numbers and names communities need to complete their proposals. We at the IETF will continue to engage with them with their work, just as they assisted us with ours.

- Later, the IANA Transition Coordination Group (ICG) will assemble a complete proposal and gather community feedback on the result. When ready, they will submit the final proposal to the NTIA.

- The NTIA must then consider and approve the proposal.

- Finally, it must be implemented.
“While there will assuredly be some bumps along the road to success, the IETF leadership are committed to ensuring a good outcome for the Internet.”

III. The purpose of an appeal is to prevent an outcome or future actions by misled/misreading users who could put the technology in jeopardy.

➔ As a result, I consider that the way the WG has been chartered and managed, the way the text has been written, the way it has been enacted even before it is published, the way it is discussed in the NTIA/ICANN and I*Core context without the necessary technical precautions has already destabilized the internet technology discussion and operations in a way that RFC 6852 inadequately tried to prevent.

“The IESG further notes that appeals of this length, and appeals that use novel and/or unfamiliar terminology and expect readers to understand it are not helpful to the process. We strongly encourage appellants to be brief, clear, and to the point.”

➔ This does not seem to be a judicious remark. It could be understood as meaning that the IESG would unwelcome and lack the capability to understand points related to permissionless innovation. It could be taken as an alibi not to respond to legitimate questions from the iucg@ietf.org.

It might mislead the scientific, technologic, political, press, users, etc. communities in believing the IETF lobbies for an architectural, technical, and operational conservatism. This might trigger their competition spirit too much, leading them to engage in an uncoordinated competition that might destabilize the network operations. IETF and IAB have no direct control over the stability of the network, but they certainly are among those who share the widest influence and, therefore, responsibility in this area.

Technologies based upon new concepts, as the one that is shortly introduced as an example in my appeal, will start proliferating as a result of the NTIA transition. What the NTIA and the public are interested in knowing is precisely how their novelty and their so-called ignored terminology are going to be embed or to intimately interface or extend the IETF technology in ways that are unfamiliar.

It should precisely be the role of the appealed Draft to explain how the IETF will use the IANA, under which new/extended terms, in order to support and parameter them and their interfaces, so that the network remains stable throughout the NTIA transition.

“The actionable substance of the appeal appears to be that the consensus on the IANAPLAN document is in question because (1) the appellant was not given proper consideration by the working group, and (2) organizations, such as IEEE, W3C and other lesser known organisations were not included and given consideration.

“The appellant also calls the working group charter into question, but he has brought charter issues up before and there has been no consensus to make changes in response to those issues, and the time is well past for appeals related to the content of the charter: the charter approval was announced on 8
September, 2014, so the two-month period specified in Section 6.5.4 of RFC 2026 ended in early November.”

➔ This is a good remark showing that the RFC 2026 rigidity might be inappropriate in such cases.

“The IANAPLAN working group, in common with other IETF working groups and according to IETF process, considers input according to the issues and arguments raised, not favoring input from organizations (through liaisons) over input from individuals, and allowing all contributions to be made via the working group mailing list. Announcements of the working group's charter were made, as is usual, on the ietf-announce and new-work mailing lists, to ensure that individuals from all organizations could be informed of the work and participants were solicited in that manner. Quite a number of individuals have participated as a result of that solicitation. Further, some organizations have given input through formal liaison channels. It is the IESG's judgment that the process has been followed correctly in this regard.”

➔ This is not the point of the appeal. I fully agree that the process has been respected, that the outcome represents the consensus of the IETF. The point is that the outcome is likely to put the internet technology in jeopardy.

“It is the IESG's judgment, having reviewed the working group's email archive, that Mr Morfin had significant participation in the working group, that his input was considered, and that where he was not satisfied with the result, it was not because he was ignored. The appellant also notes that because there is a PR action preventing him from posting to the IETF discussion list, he could not participate in the last call of the document. Yet the last call notice says that "Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iessg@ietf.org instead." Mr Morfin could well have participated in last call through that means, and did not. He also does not cite any issues that were discussed during last call that he was barred from commenting on.

“Again, my points are not that the RFC 2026 process has not been respected, but that in respecting that process, the IETF has reached a consensus which is to the disadvantage of the various implied communities.”

➔ A reason might be that a multistakeholder decision process has not been decided on by a multistakeholder decision process.

“The IESG, therefore, considers that all individuals and organizations were given the opportunity to contribute to the discussion according to normal IETF processes, that no person or organization was denied the ability to contribute, and that all contributions received were properly handled and considered. Consequently, the IESG denies this appeal.”

➔ This creates a new objection. The lack of response to the questions that have been asked looks to be in opposition with the RFC 6852 principles of: due process, broad consensus, transparency, balance, and openness.
This will result in collective empowersments that will “contribute to the creation of global communities, benefiting humanity” by choices based on competition and “technical merit”, “global interoperability, scalability, stability, and resiliency”. Such creations are welcome, but it is worrying that the IETF as the OpenStand SDO of the ICANN RFC 6852 Global Community does not consider the consequence of their competitive coming.

“The IESG further notes that the IANAPLAN document is very clear about what the scope of the document is, and that it is specifically in response to the request for input from the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG).

No further scope is implied nor can be inferred.”

This appeal has been purposely detailed for everyone to be able to be able to make his/her opinion on this last statement.

It is my opinion that the RFC 2026 is not RFC 6852 compliant in this case. This means that in addition to the change in the IETF mission introduced by RFC 6852 and the IANAPLAN Draft, the IESG shows that the adopted process might be inadequate or insufficient for the protection of the rights of all internet users and of the interoperability of the IETF technology.

X. The 36 questions

Here are gathered all the questions concerning the IETF consensus approved by the IESG, the IESG did not even consider.

Question 01

Does this IETF consensus imply that the IETF wants to focus on the practical details of its IANA contract to ICANN rather than on the overall stability of its technology in an ICANN context, meaning it relies on ICANN expertise to best organize and lead the internet multistakeholder governance?

Question 02

Does this IETF consensus imply that the IETF is first committed to the ICANN scenario although it seems to differ with the NTIA announced one?

Question 03

Does this IETF consensus imply that in terms of evaluating the consequence of the NTIA Transition the IAB considers that only functional engineering aspects are impacted and that no
architectonic concerns are to be considered that might have architectural consequences are to be investigated and discussed?

Question 04

Would this not call for some consideration when the intent is to transfer 40 years of US sovereign oversight on a NSA-compatible world key technology considered as quasiproprietary (cf. President Obama) to a multiple stakeholder undefined system animated by an objected non-profit, non-member corporation.

Question 05

Does this IETF consensus imply that the IAB does not want to affirm its control of the “.arpa” top-zone and its “iana” domain name as a catenet information center of reference for its internet technology?

Question 06

Does this IETF consensus imply that the ICANN vision supersedes the NTIA announcement or is it a stand-by position while a new “supply/demand” consensus develops over the multiplural catenet governance or an intrinsic permanent consensus of the IETF?

Question 07

In the same way, does it means that the IETF implements the RFC 6852 paradigm as the proper principles for interoperable “permissionless innovations” by other “Global Communities”?

Question 08

Does this IETF consensus imply that the IETF does not consider having a part in any manner to the internet naming space, and fully delegates its management to ICANN?

Question 09

In case of conflict with the IANA operator, will IETF/IAB ask VeriSign for the protection of its “.arpa” zone resolution?
Question 10

Does the IETF consensus imply that there is no need for an IANA protocol to help the documentation community consistently document a situation where permissionless innovation and technical orientations will be the sole market influence on standard adoption?

Question 11

Or does it consider that the documentation sub-communities (in each RFC 6852 global community) should be free to present and adapt the IETF requests for comments in the way they consider as most appropriate for/within their global community (i.e. national, operating system, market, edge provider, Libre, etc. communities)?

Question 12

Does the IETF consensus imply that there is no need for ICANN and the NTIA to consider any possible impact from a larger use of the DNS built-in reentrant CLASS system that enables thousands of roots to safely coexist (as reminded in the ICANN Internet Coordination Policy # 3 [ICP-3])?

Question 13

I must say that I share this opinion, but prefer to follow the ICP-3 precautions in terms of experimentation and prepare a second ICP-3 conformant live testing (further to my previous “dot-root” community test-bed) concerning CLASS “FL” (Free/Libre) to be both supported by a root system and an “HomeRoot” use. Am I over-precautionary in such a permissionless simple application of RFCs?

Question 14

Does the IETF consensus imply that there is no need to consider: ? a possible divergence between RIR and the IETF, for example in a case leading to a change of the IANA operator? ? a non-IETF permissionless innovation introducing another numbering scheme?

Question 15

Does the IETF consensus imply that there is no specific policy development to consider in case ICANN undertakes to support other global community equivalents to the IANA or sponsors development by an emerging documentation community?
Question 16

Does the IETF consensus silence on the points that the (US) Law remains the only arbitrator in terms of community dissensus imply that there is no specific policy development requirement to consider in this area?

Question 17

Does the IETF consensus silence on the IETF Trust copyrights imply a tacit agreement of this consequence?

Question 18

Does the IETF consensus imply that the IAB is no longer considering undertaking its responsibilities in the NTIA organized cross-accountability framework IAB/ICANN through the delegation of the “iana.arpa” sources to the “iana.org” service?

Question 19

Does the IETF consensus silence on the ICANN accountability framework imply a tacit agreement of this consequence?

Question 20

Does the IETF consensus mean that the IETF considers that ICANN is only accountable to the IAB/IETF for the publishing of the protocol parameters?

Question 21

Does the IETF consensus silence on its announced obedience to the NTIA imply a tacit indication that this subjection to the IANA is a one shot case?

Question 22

In the absence of an indication in the appealed Draft of an internal IETF procedure concerning the very decision to change the IANA operator (see below), it seems that it will simply call for an IAB consensus (or vote, since votes are sometimes used at the IETF) that can be appealed to ISOC and disputed in US Courts. Is that correct?
Question 23

Does the IETF consensus silence on this point imply a tacit indication that this would not be a problem for the IETF? This is important for other communities shopping for their own registries operator.

Question 24

Does this IETF response imply that the IETF considers that any jurisdiction, anywhere in the world, is valid in case of the misbehavior of the IANA operator?

Question 25

Why has no international legal expert panel been requested to assist the WG review of this text?

Question 26

Does this IETF response imply that the IETF considers that the transition will: ? not modify the global technological context of the digisphere? ? or that the momentum of the current practice will last forever regardless of the permissionless innovations that may happen?

Question 27

Does the IETF consensus imply that it considers that external permissionless innovation will not necessitate its IANA operator’s requirements to adapt?

Question 28

Who is a stakeholder in the IETF parlance? What is the eventual conclusion on the IETF “Paywall” issue?

Question 29

What is the IETF position regarding the omnistakeholder vision, considering how it is difficult to gather abstainers, but that they also make the bulk of the users multitude and eventually also make the changes and revolutions?
Question 30

Does this IETF response imply that the IETF considers that there is no procedural need to protect the exchanges with the IANA systems, and that they are possibly immune from exploits?

Question 31

Does this IETF response imply that the IETF considers that there is no IANA services stress test or an evaluation period under their new governance circumstances?

Question 32

Does this IETF consensus imply that the IETF considers the internet technology to be now mature enough to be immune from multiplurual permissionless innovations using the Catenet reentrance?

Question 33

Does this IETF consensus imply that the IETF estimates that it has sufficiently considered the pragmatic credibility of the NTIA scenario and does not expect to have to carry out periodic reviews of the general catenet architecture and of the architectonic practices?

Question 34

Does this IETF consensus as it is worded imply that the IETF does not consider that it would need to set-up a permanent mailing list among the OpenStand signatories and endorsers, extended to Libre, IUsers, Governments and industry community for everyone to be kept abreast of the ongoing permissionless innovation?

Question 35

The consensus does exist, but it is by the IETF "affinity group". I myself, and most probably others, need more clues to understand what to do with it. This is why I have listed the Questions that are needed for RFC.3774-affinity-group non-members to understand what it means. Would there be additional points that should be addressed in such a perspective?
Question 36

This Question is a practical summary of the consequences of the IETF consensual position: is there a problem for the “Relationnels Libres” community to operate an information service at “iana.zone” and further on an adequate TLD of the “FL” (Free/LIBRE) CLASS (see above)?